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ABSTRACT 
Two studies conducted in the aftermath of the Cote d'Ivoire civil war tested the anxiety buffer disruption 
theory prediction that high war exposure and/or high posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are 
associated with a disruption in normal anxiety buffering functioning. In line with predictions, Study 1 
indicated that mortality salience (as compared to a control condition) increased immediate death-
related thought accessibility in persons with high but not low levels of PTSD symptoms. Thus, whereas 
low PTSD symptom participants showed the previously documented apparent suppression of classic 
priming effects when exposed to death reminders, high PTSD symptom participants did not exhibit this 
defense. Study 2 demonstrated that mortality salience interacted with trauma exposure to affect 
reports of trauma symptoms. Specifically, it led individuals high in exposure to the war, but not those 
low in exposure, to report more trauma symptoms than in the control condition. The discussion 
addresses the role of anxiety buffer functioning in responses to traumatic stress and how the anxiety 
buffer disruption theory approach relates to other theories of trauma. 
 
According to DSM-IV, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is precipitated by a traumatic event that 
typically involves threat to one’s own or another’s life, and results in (1) recurrent reexperiencing of the 
traumatic event in flashbacks, nightmares, or intrusive thoughts, (2) avoidance of reminders of the 
traumatic event and generalized numbing of emotional responses, and (3) heightened arousal, as 
evidenced by hyper-vigilance, sleep disturbances, or exaggerated startle response (American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). The overall picture of the person suffering from PTSD is that of a 
person struggling with recurrent bouts of overwhelming terror (e.g., Herman, 1997; Horowitz, 1976). 
Terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) posits that cultural 
worldviews, self-esteem, and close interpersonal relationships work together to protect individuals 
from the potential for anxiety that is a by-product of human awareness of the inevitability of death. The 
nature of the events that precipitate PTSD and the resulting patterns of thought, behavior, and emotion 
suggest that TMT might provide a viable framework for conceptualizing at least some of the 
psychological processes involved in PTSD. 
Anxiety Buffer Disruption Theory (ABDT; Abdollahi, Pyszczynski, Maxfield, & Luszczynska, 2008) uses 
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TMT to provide a broad theoretical framework for understanding diverse human responses to trauma. 
ABDT builds on previous theories of trauma that emphasize shattered assumptions, malfunctioning 
schemas, and disrupted meaning systems that occur in response to traumatic events (e.g., Dalgleish, 
2004; Horowitz, 1974, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Koltko-Rivera, 2000, 2004). The central proposition of 
ABDT is that traumatic events produce their disruptive effects, at least in part, because they disrupt the 
capacity of the individual’s meaning systems, self-esteem, and close relationships to perform their 
normal anxiety-buffering functions. This leaves the individual susceptible to recurrent bouts of anxiety 
and intrusive thoughts, and hyper-sensitive to and prone to avoid threat-related stimuli. In this paper, 
we examined this idea by testing two hypotheses derived from ABDT: (1) high levels of PTSD symptom 
severity is associated with a disruption of the death-related thought suppression that is typically found 
in response to mortality salience (cf. Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997), and (2) 
high levels of exposure to trauma are associated with more severe reports of PTSD symptoms in 
response to reminders of mortality. By assessing these hypotheses with survivors of the recent Côte 
d'Ivoire civil war, the present studies extend the generality of previous findings (Abdollahi et al., 2008) 
to a different type of trauma in a different cultural milieu. 
From TMT... 
TMT posits that awareness of human mortality and vulnerability creates the potential for anxiety that 
would disrupt normal functioning unless effectively managed. This anxiety is managed in two distinct 
ways depending on whether thoughts of death are in current conscious attention or are accessible but 
outside of awareness (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). When thoughts of death are in current 
focal attention, proximal terror management defenses are initiated. This first line of defense endeavors 
to remove death thoughts from focal attention and may entail simply not thinking about death, actively 
suppressing such thoughts, or trying to convince oneself that one is less vulnerable to death. Consistent 
with this idea, unlike other types of primes, reminders of death (mortality salience; MS) do not 
immediately increase the accessibility of death-related thoughts, but the accessibility of such thoughts 
does increase over time after a delay and distraction (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 
1994). Consistent with the idea that this lack of an immediate priming effect reflects active suppression 
of death-related thought, research has shown that MS primes do produce an immediate increase in 
death-thought accessibility, similar to that found with other types of primes, when they are presented 
subliminally (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997) or when participants are placed under 
high cognitive load (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997). This latter finding is consistent with Ironic 
Process Theory findings (Wegner, 1989) that cognitive load disrupts thought suppression processes. 
Denial based proximal defenses entail distorting one’s perceptions to imply that one will live a long life 
and that death will not be a problem until the distant future (Greenberg et al., 1993; Greenberg, Arndt, 
Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000) or compensatory inflation of positive affect (DeWall & 
Baumeister, 2008). Health-promoting proximal defenses involve engaging (or intending to engage in) 
behavior that is likely to decrease vulnerability to death (e.g., decreasing tanning, increasing exercising; 
see Goldenberg & Arndt, 2009 for a review). In short, proximal defenses are means of coping with 
thoughts of death that are in current conscious attention in a relatively direct manner by suppressing 
such thoughts, denying or reducing one’s vulnerability to death, or inflating positive affect to counter 
the potential for anxiety. 
Distal defenses, on the other hand, deal with the problem of death when it is on the fringes of 
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consciousness and do so in a manner that is not directly, logically, or semantically related to the 
problem of death. Distal terror management defenses involve a tripartite system of imbuing life with 
meaning, value, and security that entail maintaining: (1) faith in a cultural worldview, (2) one’s value 
within that worldview (commonly referred to as self-esteem), and (3) close interpersonal attachments. 
Distal defenses are initiated when death-related thoughts are accessible, but not in focal attention. 
These defenses do not logically imply that one will not die, but rather imbue people with a security-
providing sense that they are valued contributors to a meaningful universe. Because TMT is a social 
psychological theory that was initially developed to explain why people need self-esteem, faith in the 
correctness of their beliefs and values, and what happens when their self-esteem and worldview 
confidence is threatened, the vast majority of TMT research has been focused on these distal forms of 
defense. 
Much of the evidence for distal terror management defenses comes from studies that have examined 
the mortality salience hypothesis or its variants. According to this hypothesis, when people are 
confronted with death, they strengthen their support for cultural worldviews, self-esteem, and close 
relationships because these psychological structures provide protection against existential anxiety. 
Accordingly, MS has been shown to lead to increased worldview defense (for a review, see Greenberg, 
Solomon, & Arndt, 2007), increased self-esteem striving (for a review, see Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004), and increased concerns for secure attachment (for a review, see 
Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003), compared to a variety of control conditions. Conversely, 
threats to self-esteem (Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & Williams, 2008), cultural worldviews (Schimel, Hayes, 
Williams, & Jahrig, 2007), and close relationships (Mikulincer, Florian, Birnbaum, & Malishkevich, 2002), 
have been shown to increase the accessibility of death-related but not other negative or anxiety-
provoking thoughts. Other studies have shown that affirming or defending one’s worldview, selfesteem, 
or close attachments decrease the accessibility of death- related thoughts after MS priming (e.g., 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). 
Taken together, these findings provide converging support for the TMT proposition that proximal and 
distal terror management defenses work together to manage existential anxiety. Given the disruptive 
effect that anxiety can have on behavior, especially anxiety regarding things that cannot be predicted, 
controlled, or avoided, a well-functioning anxiety-buffering system would seem essential for 
psychological well-being and effective functioning. 
...to Anxiety Buffer Disruption Theory 
Recent research derived from TMT has begun to explore the role of death-related concerns in 
psychopathology, particularly with regards to anxiety disorders (see Arndt, Routledge, Cox, & 
Goldenberg, 2005 for a review). For example, Strachan et al. (2007) argue that some anxiety disorders 
stem from inefficient attempts to cope with death anxiety. In three studies with participants who had 
different anxiety-related problems (i.e., arachnophobia, compulsive behaviors, and social phobia), 
compared to control conditions involving other aversive thoughts, reminders of death increased the 
severity of anxiety-related responses, but only for individuals who had the most pronounced problems 
with these specific types of anxiety in the first place. For instance, MS increased avoidance of images of 
spiders, but only for participants who met diagnostic criteria for specific phobia. Similarly, MS increased 
hand-washing behavior and social avoidance, but only among those who were high on obsessive-
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compulsive tendencies and social anxiety, respectively. Along similar lines, Kosloff et al. (2006) 
examined dissociative responses to 9/11 events as a function of MS. Compared to a control condition, 
MS increased levels of anxiety sensitivity and reported levels of dissociative responses to 9/11 terrorist 
attacks among American university students. 
ABDT was initially proposed in Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon’s (2003) analysis of Americans’ 
reactions to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in which they suggested that clinically significant reactions to the 
trauma of these attacks would be most likely among those for whom the attacks produced a serious 
disruption of normal anxiety-buffering functioning. From this perspective, traumatic events have the 
potential to disrupt crucial elements of people’s worldviews, self-esteem, and interpersonal 
attachments, thus rendering them unable to protect themselves from anxiety. Low levels of disruption 
lead to especially strong efforts to reassert these damaged structures, resulting in increased worldview 
defense, self-esteem striving, and needs for secure attachments. Consistent with this idea, research 
conducted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks has shown that reminders of either one’s own death or the 
events of 9/11 increased support for President Bush and his policies, including the use of extreme 
military force to fight terrorism (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski et al., 2006). However, more 
extreme disruption of the anxiety buffer can entail a more thorough collapse of normal anxiety buffering 
functioning. This is especially likely to occur in response to extremely traumatic events among persons 
who dissociate at the time of the event and have other factors that predispose them to PTSD (Ozer, Best, 
Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). Disruption of anxiety-buffer functioning leaves such persons unprotected from 
existential fears and prone to the emergence of PTSD-related behavior and symptoms, such as hyper-
arousal, intrusive thoughts, flashbacks, nightmares, avoidance of trauma-related stimuli, interpersonal 
difficulties, and substance abuse. From this perspective, many such PTSD-related behaviors are viewed 
as attempts to cope with the emotional consequences of disruption of normal anxiety-buffer 
functioning. 
ABDT integrates TMT with previous theories of trauma that emphasize shattered assumptions, 
schemas, meaning systems, or worldviews (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004; Horowitz, 1974, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 
1992; Koltko-Rivera, 2000, 2004). From these perspectives, critical assumptions about the world and 
oneself are likely to be shattered when people are exposed to terrifying events that violate their 
understanding of the world as a safe and benevolent place. ABDT posits that this shattering of 
assumptions disrupts the normal functioning of the anxiety-buffering system. Consequently, threats 
that would previously have instigated terror management defenses cease to do so, leaving the person 
prone to extreme distress. 
Initial experimental support for ABDT comes from two studies conducted among survivors of the 2005 
Zarand earthquake in Iran (Abdollahi et al., 2008). This work showed that: (1) high levels of reported 
dissociation 1 month post-event are associated with atypical terror management responses in the form 
of low levels of worldview defense and high levels of negative affect in response to reminders of death 
at that time, (2) this dissociation predicts severity of PTSD symptoms 2 years later, (3) high levels of 
PTSD symptoms 2 years later are associated with simultaneous atypical responses to reminders of 
mortality, and (4) disrupted patterns of worldview defense at 1 month and 2 years posttrauma mediate 
the relationship between dissociation and PTSD. 
In summary, there is growing evidence from clinical and social psychological research that severe 
trauma can produce a disruption of the anxiety buffer system, resulting in an alteration of terror 
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management defenses. In addition, this appears particularly likely among individuals who dissociate at 
the time of the traumatic event and who exhibit the most severe symptoms of PTSD. While this 
disruption of anxiety-buffering functioning has been demonstrated to occur on distal defenses by 
Abdollahi et al. (2008), our aim in the current studies was to determine if proximal defenses such as 
thought suppression and denial of one’s problems are also disrupted among those with high levels of 
trauma exposure and PTSD symptoms. 
Overview of Present Research 
The goal of the present studies was to determine if previous findings of an association between adverse 
reactions to trauma and disruption of distal terror management defenses extends to proximal terror 
management defenses of thought suppression and threat denial. These questions were addressed in 
two studies, conducted in 2007 and 2008, in the aftermath of the Côte d'Ivoire civil war (September 2002 
through March 2007). All participants had been exposed to war but they differed in their levels of war 
exposure and, concomitantly, in the intensity of their trauma and its sequelae. The disruption of 
proximal defenses should appear following MS among individuals who are the most disturbed by the 
war. Hence, we expected that in Study 1, participants with high levels of PTSD symptoms would not 
show the typical suppression of death related thoughts in response to mortality salience that has been 
found in many previous studies (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997), and that was expected to be found among 
participants with low levels of symptoms in the present study. In other words, although low PTSD 
symptom participants were predicted not to show an increase in death thought accessibility in response 
to death reminders (as compared to a control condition), high PTSD symptom participants were 
expected to respond to death reminders with higher levels of death thought accessibility. In Study 2, we 
predicted that mortality salience would lead to a distortion in the reports of trauma symptoms among 
participants with high but not low exposure to the war. More specifically, mortality salience (as com-
pared to a control condition) would lead to increased reports of PTSD symptoms, but only among 
participants with high levels of war exposure. Such findings would be consistent with a disruption of 
proximal defenses, which would complement the findings of Abdollahi et al. (2008) concerning distal 
defenses. 
Study 1 
Research suggests that one of the first and simplest means of coping with death-related thoughts is to 
suppress them when their accessibility increases, so that they do not reach conscious attention. Indeed, 
unlike other types of priming, exposure to death- related primes does not lead to an immediate increase 
in accessibility of death-related thoughts (Greenberg et al., 1994) unless the person is put under high 
cognitive load, which has been shown by previous research (Wegner, 1990) to disrupt thought 
suppression (Arndt et al., 1997). To determine whether this form of proximal defense is disrupted in 
persons with high levels of PTSD symptoms, we exposed participants with high and low levels of PTSD 
symptoms to reminders of the possibility of dying in the civil war or another aversive topic that is not 
related to death (taking a difficult exam in college), and then assessed the accessibility of death-related 
thoughts. Like participants in previous TMT studies, participants low in PTSD were not expected to 
report higher accessibility of death-related thoughts in the MS than in the control condition because 
they actively suppress such thoughts (Arndt et al., 1997). However, because of the disruption of normal 
proximal terror management defenses, accessibility of death-related thoughts was expected to increase 
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among high PTSD participants when they are reminded of their possible death as compared to the 
control condition. 
METHOD 
Participants and design.  
There were 105 students of the University of Abidjan (19 women and 86 men) who volunteered to 
participate in a short opinion survey about the civil war. Their mean age was 28.01 years (SD = 3.36). To 
ensure an accurate and ethical presentation of the survey, participants were informed that it could 
generate unpleasant emotions and were told that they could discontinue participation at any time if 
they desired. They first completed The Post-Traumatic Stress Checklist-Civilian Version (PCL-C; 
Weathers & Ford, 1996; Weathers, Litz, Huska, & Keane, 1994). Next, they were randomly assigned to a 
MS or to a control condition. Finally, they completed a word-completion task used to assess the 
accessibility of death-related thoughts. The design was thus a 2 (PTSD: low vs. high) X 2 (experimental 
condition: control vs. MS). The questionnaire was in French, the official language of Côte d'Ivoire. 
PTSD assessment.  
The PCL-C consists of 17 items, each corresponding to one of the 3 DSM-IV PTSD symptom clusters (i.e., 
reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal). For each item, participants indicated how much they have 
suffered from the particular symptom in the last month on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely). The PCL-C has satisfactory psychometric properties and diagnostic efficiency (e.g., 
Blanchard, Jones-Alexander, Buckley, & Forneris, 1996). A total score was computed (averaging all 
items), with higher scores indicating stronger PTSD symptoms (Cronbach’s α = .88). 
Mortality salience.  
By random assignment, half of the participants answered two questions designed to induce thoughts 
of their own death (“Please, describe the emotions you feel when you think that you may have been 
killed during the war” and “Please, imagine and describe the way you may have been killed during this 
war”). The other half answered two questions designed to induce unpleasant thoughts unrelated to 
death (“Please, describe the emotions you feel when you think about one of your last difficult exam in 
college” and “Please, imagine and describe what you have thought and felt during this exam”). This 
manipulation of mortality salience was modeled after previous work (e.g., Kosloff et al., 2006). However, 
unlike most previous TMT studies, the present study examined the effects of thoughts about death 
related to a specific traumatic event. 
Accessibility of death-related thoughts.  
Death-thought accessibility (DTA) was measured via completion of a word fragment task with death-
related and neutral words. Participants had to complete 25 word fragments, 5 of which could be 
completed with either a death-related word or a neutral word. For example, the fragment T O _ _ _ could 
be completed as TOMBE (a death-related word) or as TOTAL (a neutral word). The possible French 
death-related words were tombe (grave), tuerie (slaughter), cercueil (coffin), mort (dead), and deuil 
(bereavement). The other fragments served as filler items. The number of completed death-related 
words was used as an indicator of death-related thought accessibility. This task, adapted from Tulving, 
Schacter, and Stark (1982), has been used successfully in many previous terror management studies 
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(e.g., Arndt, Cook, Goldenberg, & Cox, 2007; Greenberg et al., 1994; Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). 
RESULTS 
A regression analysis was performed predicting death-related thought accessibility (DTA) from 
condition (control coded —.5, MS coded .5), PTSD (continuous variable, centered), and their product 
term. This analysis revealed no main effect of condition, B = .09, SE = .18, β = .48, t(87) = .48, ns, or of 
PTSD, B = -.01, SE = .00, β = -.14, t(87) = -1.28, ns. However, as predicted, PTSD significantly moderated 
the effect of condition on DTA, B = .04, SE = .01, β = .24, t(87) = 2.33, p < .03 (see Figure 1). Simple slope 
tests (computed at ±1 SD of PTSD) revealed no effect of condition among participants relatively low in 
PTSD, B = -.35, SE = .26, β = -.19, t(87) = -1.30, ns. In contrast, participants relatively high in PTSD reported 
more DTA in the MS than in the control condition, B = .53, SE = .26, β = .30, t(87) = 2.00, p < .05. Simple 
slope tests also revealed that PTSD was negatively related to DTA in the control, B = —.03, SE = .01, β = -
.38, t(87) = -2.46, p < .02, but not in the MS condition, B = .00, SE = .01, β = .11, t(87) = .77, ns. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study indicates that, as hypothesized, MS led to an increase in DTA in high- but not in low-
PTSD participants. Indeed, although not significant, results among participants low in PTSD were 
consistent with previous TMT studies on nontraumatized populations suggesting an initial suppression 
of death-related thoughts following a mortality reminder (Greenberg et al., 1994). These atypical 
reactions to MS among individuals high in PTSD suggest that high PTSD is associated with a disruption 
in normal anxiety buffering functioning, as reflected here in impaired suppression. In the control 
condition, DTA was lower among high- than among low-PTSD participants, consistent with clinical re-
search documenting positive correlations between suppression and PTSD (e.g., Dalgleish, Hauer, & 
Kuyken, 2008). Thus, under normal circumstances, individuals suffering from strong PTSD symptoms 
seem to suppress thoughts related to death. However, making death salient apparently eliminates this 
difference between high- and low-PTSD individuals by provoking a marked DTA increase in high-PTSD 
individuals. Although predicting a difference in the control condition, to be suppressed in the 
experimental condition may not be the most conventional hypothesis, this is precisely what would be 
expected on the basis of ABDT.  
Figure 1. Death thought accessibility. 
 
In other words, a defense that high-PTSD individuals manage to use effectively under normal (control) 
conditions—suppressing death- related thoughts, is not deployed when mortality is made salient. This 
study provides the first evidence that the disruption of distal terror management defenses among 
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trauma-exposed persons with high levels of PTSD and predictors of PTSD (dissociation) demonstrated 
by Abdollahi et al., (2008) extend to proximal terror management defenses like thought suppression. 
This suggests that the disruption of anxiety-buffer functioning associated with PTSD is rather broad-
reaching. 
Study 2 
ABDT suggests that disrupted anxiety-buffer functioning makes persons more susceptible to the 
detrimental effects of thoughts about death and the traumatic event, and that this absence of 
protection is at least partly responsible for many of the symptoms of PTSD. This is consistent with other 
cognitive theories of PTSD (for comprehensive reviews, see, e.g., Brewin & Holmes, 2003; Dalgleish, 
2004), wherein the recurrent intrusive thoughts about the traumatic event and related issues are viewed 
as exacerbating anxiety and other symptoms of the disorder. According to these models, memories of 
the event and related thoughts play a major role in PTSD development and symptom etiology (e.g., 
Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Foa, Zinbarg, & Olasov-
Rothbaum, 1992; Mineka & Zinbarg, 1996, 2006). Indeed, Rubin, Berntsen, and Bohni (2008) recently 
argued that ongoing memories of the traumatizing event may be more important than the event itself 
in determining symptoms. From all of these perspectives, as well as ABDT, thoughts of the possibility of 
dying as a result of the traumatic event would be expected to lead to an exaggeration in the reports of 
trauma symptoms. This effect of threat would be expected to be found, however, only among those who 
are especially vulnerable to the disorder. Indeed, less vulnerable individuals would tend to deny their 
symptoms as a means of coping with the threat, and thus might be expected to report less severe 
symptoms in the MS than in the control condition. Study 2 was designed to test these hypotheses. 
An additional goal of Study 2 was to explore the role of another variable that has been shown to be 
related to PTSD symptom severity, extent of trauma exposure. Previous studies have shown that the 
more direct exposure one has to a traumatic event, the more likely one is to experience PTSD and the 
more severe one’s symptoms are likely to be. Virtually all theories of PTSD view the extent of exposure 
to the event as the first step in the series of psychological events that produce the disorder. Thus far, 
besides the impact of PTSD symptom severity assessed in Study 1, ABDT research has explored only one 
predictor of PTSD, peri-traumatic dissociation, and found this variable to be related to both an absence 
of normal anxiety buffer responses and higher levels of distress in response to thoughts of death or the 
traumatic event (Abdollahi et al., 2008). Study 2 extends this research by investigating the effect of 
extent of exposure to the traumatic event on reports of PTSD symptoms in response to reminders of 
death and the civil war. 
To classify participants into two groups as a function of their exposure to war (low vs. high), we used a 
geographical criterion: we selected students who were either in Abidjan (low exposure) or in Bouake 
(high exposure) at the time of the war onset. These individuals were comparable in terms of ethnicity, 
religion, and other demographic indicators. However, there were many more armed confrontations 
during the war in Bouake than in Abidjan. As a matter of fact, many students from Bouake were 
compelled to leave their city during the war and to move to Abidjan. Accordingly, students from Bouake 
were objectively more exposed to the war than students from Abidjan (this difference was verified by 
ancillary measures in the present study). 
Considering this basic difference, it was expected that students from Bouake would report higher PTSD 
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than students from Abidjan. Furthermore, this main effect of war exposure should be qualified by a 
reliable interaction between trauma exposure and reminders of the threat of death posed by the war. 
Because individuals most exposed to war are expected to fail to avoid trauma- and death-related 
thoughts, they should be more likely than less war-exposed individuals to increase their PTSD reports 
in the MS compared to the control condition. In contrast, individuals less exposed to the war, and thus 
less traumatized, would succeed in avoiding ideas associated with the trauma, and not increase their 
reports of PTSD in response to MS and might even report lower levels of symptoms as a form of 
defensive denial. 
METHOD 
Participants and design.  
There were 197 students of the University of Abidjan (47 women, 143 men, and 7 gender unspecified 
participants) who volunteered to participate in a short opinion survey about the civil war. Their mean 
age was 26.59 years (SD = 2.70). As in Study 1, they were informed that it could generate unpleasant 
emotions and were told that they could discontinue participation at any time if they desired. We 
selected only participants who were in Abidjan or in Bouake at the time of the war onset. There were 
110 students from Bouake (with high war exposure) and 87 students from Abidjan (with low war 
exposure); six participants were deleted because of missing data, leaving us with a total sample of 191. 
The design was a 2 (war exposure: high vs. low) X 2 (experimental condition: MS vs. control) between 
groups factorial. The questionnaire was in French, the official language of Cote d'Ivoire. 
Mortality salience.  
Participants were randomly assigned to the control or MS condition. To enhance the generality of the 
findings of this set of studies, a different manipulation of MS was used in this study. In the control 
condition, participants were asked five closed-ended questions about their student life (e.g., Have you 
already repeated a year at the University in the past? Yes vs. no), and 2 open-ended questions: “Please 
describe the emotions you feel when you think about your student life” and “Please imagine and 
describe how you see yourself in the future, after your studies at the University.” McGregor and Marigold 
(2003) argue that a consideration of the future can arouse uncertainty that they argue is often the threat 
underlying MS effects. This may be especially unpleasant in the present context given the high rate of 
unemployment in Côte d'Ivoire (estimated at 40-50% in 2008, cf. Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2009). 
The use of these questions about the future enables us to determine if our induction of thoughts of 
death in the civil war produced effects above and beyond those of thoughts about the future and 
uncertainty. 
In the MS condition, participants were asked five closed-ended questions about the possibility of death 
during the civil war, all of which were responded to as yes or no: “Were there armed confrontations in 
the city you were in at the time of the war onset?,” “Were you personally in danger of death during these 
armed confrontations?,” “Do you think that you may have been killed during this war?,” “Were you 
afraid to die at the time of this war?,” and “Did you feel afraid for your close others?” These questions, 
used only in the MS condition, enable us to verify that participants from Bouake have been more 
exposed to the war, and that they suffered more from this exposure, than participants from Abidjan. 
Participants were also asked two open-ended questions, modeled after those used in previous research 
on TMT (Greenberg et al., 1990): “Please, describe the emotions you feel when thinking that you may 
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have been killed during the war” and “Please, imagine and describe the way you may have been killed 
during this war.” 
Reports of PTSD symptoms.  
The PCL-C (Weathers & Ford, 1996; Weathers et al., 1994) was used to assess PTSD symptoms, but this 
time it served as our dependent variable. A total score was computed (averaging all items), with higher 
scores indicating stronger PTSD symptoms (Cronbach’s α = .86). In addition, separate scores were 
computed for the three subscales representing each symptom cluster (reexperiencing, avoidance, 
arousal). Internal consistencies were .84, .62, and .73 for these subscales, respectively. 
RESULTS 
We first verified if, as expected, participants from Bouake reported more war exposure than participants 
from Abidjan. To this end, we examined responses on the five closed-ended questions used in the MS 
condition. As expected, participants from Bouake reported more war exposure than participants from 
Abidjan. As may be seen in Table 1, participants from Bouake reported significantly greater danger of 
death, risk of being killed, and fear of dying than participants from Abidjan. Thus, these participants 
clearly experienced more exposure to traumatic violence in the war, validating our geographical 
indicator of war exposure. 
Table 1 - Percentage of Students Who Agreed With Each Item (Study 2, MS Condition) 
  
 War exposure as a function of 
participant’s city Statistics 
 Abidjan Bouake χ2 p 
1. Armed confrontations 97.2% 100.0% 1.68 ns 
2. Danger of death 22.2% 68.9% 19.42 .001 
3. Risk to be killed 66.6% 94.8% 13.13 .001 
4. Afraid to die 50.0% 82.7% 11.39 .001 
5. Afraid for close others 94.4% 98.2% 1.05 ns 
Note. Analyses are based on a sample size of 94 (36 participants were from Abidjan and 58 from Bouake); note that 
only participants in the MS condition were asked these questions about war exposure. 
 
To test our main prediction, we conducted an ANOVA with participants’ war exposure (low vs. high) and 
experimental condition (MS vs. control) as independent variables to predict reported PTSD symptoms. 
Results of this analysis revealed no main effect of experimental condition, F(1, 191) < 1. However, there 
was a main effect of war exposure, F(1, 191) = 9.07, p < .01, η2 = .045. Overall, highly war-exposed students 
(M = 2.55, SD = .81) reported higher PTSD symptoms than those less exposed to war (M = 2.21, SD = .82). 
As predicted, this main effect was qualified by a reliable interaction, F(1, 191) = 6.17, p < .02, η2 = .031 
(see Table 2 for means). 
This interaction showed that high war-exposure participants reported higher PTSD symptoms in the MS 
than in the control condition, t(191) = 2.01, p < .05. In contrast, participants less exposed to war tended 
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to report lower PTSD symptoms in the MS than in the control condition, although this difference was 
not significant, t(191) = 1.54, p < .11. Pairwise comparisons also revealed that the difference in reported 
PTSD between high and low war-exposure students was significant in the MS, t(191) = 3.92, p < .01, but 
not in the control condition, t(191) = .38, ns. 
Parallel analyses were conducted on each of the 3 PTSD subscales. The means appear in Table 2. As 
shown in this table, the pattern of results was similar for all symptoms. High war-exposure participants 
tended to report greater symptoms in the MS than in the control condition, whereas the reverse was 
true among less war-exposed participants. The predicted interaction was significant on reexperiencing, 
F(1, 191) = 11.22, p < .01, η2 = .056. High war-exposure participants reported significantly more negative 
reexperiences in the MS than in the control condition, while low war-exposure participants reported 
significantly less reexperiencing in the MS than control condition (see Table 2). This interaction was not 
significant on the avoidance, F(1, 190) = 1.05, ns, or arousal scales, F(1, 191) = 1.69, ns. 
DISCUSSION 
In line with the notion that more extreme war exposure produces greater disruption of the anxiety 
buffering system, high war exposure participants from Bouake reported higher PTSD symptoms in the 
MS condition than in the control condition. In contrast, low war exposure participants from Abidjan 
tended to report lower PTSD symptoms overall in the MS than in the control condition. This elevation 
among the high war exposure participants is consistent with the idea that in the absence of an effective 
anxiety-buffering system, as documented in Study 1 and by Abdollahi et al. (2008), thoughts of death 
related to the traumatic event lead to a subjective increase in the distress provoked by trauma-related 
experiences. 
These findings can also be viewed as another example of disrupted anxiety-buffer functioning. From 
this perspective, the significantly lower levels of the PTSD symptom cluster, reexperiencing, found after 
MS in the low war exposure participants could reflect a form of denial—thoughts of dying in the war led 
these participants to claim that they were less disturbed by the war. This minimization of one’s suffering 
in response to reminders of the traumatic event might be part of a defensive strategy for maintaining 
self-efficacy regarding one’s ability to cope with the threatening events (e.g., Benight & Bandura, 2004; 
Benight & Harper, 2004). High war exposure participants did not show this reaction, and in fact, reported 
greater symptom severity when reminded of the possibility of dying in the war. 
Table 2 - Means of PTSD Symptoms by City of Origin and Condition, Study 2 
 Reexperiencing Avoidance Arousal PTSD total 
Low exposure (Abidjan)  
Control 2.79a (1.35) 2.09a (.85) 2.16a (1.13) 2.33a (.89) 
MS 2.18b (1.06) 1.96a (.69) 2.12a (1.12) 2.05a (.69) 
High exposure (Bouake)  
Control 2.73a (1.17) 2.14a (.72) 2.40a (1.11) 2.39a (.75) 
MS 3.30b (1.17) 2.24a (.83) 2.75a (1.07) 2.70b (.84) 
Note. Analyses are based on a sample size of 191. For each city and each column, the means with a different 
subscript differ at least at p < .05. 
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The fact that the interaction reached significance on reexperiencing but not avoidance or arousal is 
consistent with the cognitive theories of PTSD that emphasize the role of associative networks (e.g., 
Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa, Zinbarg, & Olasov-Rothbaum, 1992; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). When high 
trauma exposure participants were reminded of the possibility of dying in the war, this may have 
activated other trauma-related memories that led them to report higher levels of reexperiencing. Such 
activation of thoughts related to the event may be less likely to extend to thoughts about past feelings 
of arousal or avoidant behavior (thus, the weaker effects on these subscales). From the perspective of 
ABDT, the fact that participants were not suppressing death-related thoughts, as demonstrated in Study 
1, or using other types of terror management defenses, as demonstrated by Abdollahi et al. (2008), 
would make such activation of related thoughts especially likely for these individuals. 
All in all, these findings are consistent with our prediction that high war exposure would elicit a 
disruption of the anxiety buffer system, which is manifested here in an overestimation of past 
symptoms. We can safely conclude that this was an overestimation rather than an actual difference in 
what was experienced because the MS manipulation, to which participants were randomly assigned at 
the time of the study, could not affect what participants experienced before the study. 
General Discussion 
The results of the present studies shed new light on the relations among death concerns, anxiety-buffer 
functioning, and PTSD-related behavior in individuals with high levels of trauma exposure and PTSD 
symptoms. In line with ABDT, individuals high in PTSD in Study 1 and those high in war exposure in Study 
2 showed atypical reactions to death reminders compared to those low on these dimensions, which 
were similar to the reactions previously documented in nontraumatized samples. Consistent with the 
view that trauma entails a disruption in normal anxiety buffering functioning, the results show that: (1) 
high PTSD was associated with increased accessibility of death- related thoughts after a death 
reminder, which suggests an absence of the suppression of such thoughts that has been demonstrated 
in previous research (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, et al., 1997), and (2) high war exposure was associated 
with reports of more severe PTSD symptoms (i.e., more negative appraisals of trauma) after a death 
reminder. These findings extend those of Abdollahi et al. (2008), and indicate that trauma exposure may 
entail a disruption of even the simplest proximal terror management mechanisms, such as suppression 
and denial. 
Current cognitive models of PTSD, such as those of Ehlers and Clark (2000) and Rubin et al. (2008), 
emphasize the way trauma-exposed individuals process trauma-related memories. According to Ehlers 
and Clark (2000), negative appraisals of the trauma are central to the development and persistence of 
PTSD symptoms. In line with these views, Study 2 indicated that individuals highly exposed to war did 
not report more PTSD symptoms than individuals less exposed to war, unless they were primed with a 
mortality-related trauma reminder. However, after MS, the divergence emerged, as high war exposure 
was related to more negative appraisals of past symptoms. Thus, this finding complements previous 
research by suggesting that individuals high and low in war exposure may not necessarily differ in the 
frequency of PTSD symptoms. Rather, one crucial difference between these two groups seems to be the 
way in which they mentally regulate trauma-related memories in response to stimuli that could prime 
additional trauma-related thoughts. 
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In this way, Study 2 results are consistent with previous research by Strachan et al. (2007) in a clinical 
population, and by Kosloff et al. (2006) in a trauma-exposed population, showing more anxious 
responses after a death reminder than in control conditions. Study 1 extended these findings in an 
important way, pointing to a possible cognitive mechanism to account for such effects (i.e., the 
accessibility of death-related thoughts). It appears that individuals low in PTSD successfully suppressed 
death-related thoughts in response to reminders of the trauma: they did not exhibit higher death-
related thought accessibility in the MS than in the control condition. In contrast, individuals high in 
PTSD failed to suppress death-related thoughts when reminded of their possible death during the war. 
For the latter, death-related thought accessibility was higher in the MS than in the control condition. 
Interestingly, in the absence of MS, high PTSD participants in Study 1 showed lower levels of death-
related thought accessibility than low PTSD participants. This may reflect the avoidant tendency that is 
characteristic and indeed part of the definition of PTSD. This avoidance disappeared, however, when 
these high PTSD participants were reminded of the traumatic event. In this sense, avoidance and 
suppression appear to be inefficient when individuals with PTSD are confronted with trauma memories, 
that is, when they most need effective coping strategies (for a similar conclusion, see Dalgleish et al., 
2008). In line with Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model, a failure in the mental regulation of death-related 
thoughts when trauma memories are brought to conscious- ness may contribute to a sense of current 
threat, and thus play a central role in the persistence of PTSD symptoms. 
One alternative explanation for the present results must be addressed. It seems plausible that 
vulnerable individuals (high-PTSD or those highly exposed to war) have stronger reactions to MS not 
because their defenses collapse but because of a simple priming effect. Because these individuals have 
been strongly traumatized, their semantic memory may be richer in death and trauma-related material 
and thus more responsive to priming death than the semantic memory of those less traumatized. This 
explanation seems an unlikely explanation for the present findings for at least two reasons. First, even 
if the reaction of less vulnerable individuals to MS was weaker, it would still be expected to be in the 
same direction as the reaction of those highly vulnerable. However, in both studies, the reaction of those 
high and low vulnerable persons to MS go in the opposite direction. Second, recall that in the first study 
control condition, high-PTSD participants had lower DTA than low-PTSD participants. This strongly 
suggests that there is suppression under normal circumstances in high-PTSD participants (otherwise, if 
anything, they would be expected to have higher DTA than low-PTSD participants). If this difference is 
eliminated in the MS condition because of a significant increase in DTA among high-PTSD participants, 
this seems to point to a collapse of the suppression defense mechanism, rather than to a simple priming 
effect. For these reasons, priming does not account for the present findings as well as the ABDT 
explanation. 
The results of the present studies may have implications for cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) of PTSD 
(see Harvey, Bryant, & Tarrier, 2003 for a comprehensive review). CBT is primarily based on repeated 
imagined exposure, requiring patients to focus on the most distressing aspects of the trauma memories, 
and to write down detailed descriptions of their traumatic experience. CBT has been found to be 
effective in preventing PTSD development and maintenance. However, the precise mechanisms 
responsible for the effectiveness of CBT are not entirely clear (Harvey et al., 2003). The most commonly 
proposed mechanism is habituation to fear, which is expected to reduce anxiety. From the perspective 
of ABDT, however, recovering from trauma would be greatly facilitated by the restoration of effective 
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anxiety buffer functioning. Such a restoration may be encouraged by aspects of CBT that provide 
meaning, self-esteem, and relatedness to those being treated. Further research is needed to examine 
this possibility. 
Some limitations of the present studies need to be acknowledged. One issue is the fact that our 
experimental inductions did not differentiate between trauma-related memories and death- related 
memories. In the experimental conditions, participants were asked to imagine their own possible death 
during the war. In all likelihood, this induction simultaneously activated both concerns about death and 
trauma-related memories. However, by definition, a traumatic event involves “actual or threatened 
death or serious injury or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others” eliciting “intense fear, 
helplessness, or horror” (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, pp. 427-428). Thus, it seemed to us 
quite difficult to differentiate between the two in the context of the experience of traumatized persons. 
Moreover, previous research has found that a mortality salience condition led to essentially the same 
effects as a trauma salience condition (see Abdollahi et al., 2008). However, it may be of interest to 
examine the amount of overlap between the two constructs in future research. 
In conclusion, the present studies show that high war exposure and high PTSD are associated with an 
alteration in the most basic proximal terror management defenses, that is, thought suppression and 
denial. This suggests that recovering from trauma might necessitate restoring an effectively functioning 
anxiety buffer. This opens new avenues for research in both the laboratory and, as in the present studies, 
in naturalistic settings. It also suggests new avenues to be explored regarding the process of recovery 
from this devastating psychological condition. 
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